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Abstract 
All Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) involves risk. Supplementing the IB literature, we assess 
the effects of financial system risk on FDI trends. Specifically, we propose a new theoretical 
paradigm combining institutional risk aversion and institutional affinity, suggesting MNE-
generated FDI will be sensitive to sovereign and bank-related risks. Employing a large panel 
of bilateral FDI holdings from 112 origin countries in the Eurozone, results show that 
financial stability in origin and host countries, matters for FDI. Policymakers in countries 
seeking to attract FDI should be attentive to both domestic conditions and the financing 
environment that MNEs encounter in their home countries. 
 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Multinational Enterprises; Financial Stability; 
Institutional Risk Aversion; Euro Area; International Regulation. 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a very extensive body of literature on the FDI choices of firms. This has firstly been 
ascribed to particular advantages of the host country. For example, host countries may 
provide significant new markets that would be impossible to access without a direct presence 
there, and which may offer the opportunity of employing new skills and capabilities (Lu et 
al., 2014). They may also offer tax and/or regulatory advantages (Jones and Temouri, 2016). 
Again, in expanding abroad, firms may opt for a context about which they have some 
familiarity (Choi et al., 2016).  Push factors from the home country may include the need to 
escape regulation and/or tax, domestic shortfalls in skills and technological capabilities, 
apprehension about the future productive capacity of the economy and/or market size 
(Barnard and Luiz, 2018; Cuevara-Cazurra and Ramamurti, 2015).  International expansion 
may also be due to internal firm level dynamics, such as agency failures and/or because of 
specific ownership dynamics such as family ownership (Ilhan-Nas et al., 2018; Lien and 
Filatotchev, 2015).  However, in all instances, investing abroad involves either reducing or 
taking on board new risk (Buckley, 2016b).  Again, there is a very extensive IB body of 
literature on such risk. The latter has been conceptualised in political, social, geographical, 
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technological, regulatory and/or organisational specific terms (Narula, 2015).  In general 
terms, risk may be defined as an unexpected downturn in business outcomes (e.g., profit, 
market share, security of assets) (Miller 1992).   
 
The existing IB literature has only accorded limited attention to a key element of risk, that 
posed by changes in macro-economic dynamics, including the stability of the financial 
system (see Nielsen et al., 2017). This latter risk has particularly concerned policymakers 
since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of the previous decade and resulted in regulatory 
frameworks such as the Basel accords which typically seek to increase the amount of capital 
held by banks and other financial sector firms (Acharya et al., 2014). Again, although the 
corporate finance and governance literature speaks directly to a range of managerial issues, 
and has formed the base of a burgeoning body of trans-disciplinary scholarship, this has 
tended to focus on institutional quality and the risks associated with it (Goergen et al., 2017) 
and more recently, macro and comparative approaches perspectives on institutional affinity 
(Shukla and Cantwell, 2018).  In contrast, the broader structures and assets strand of the 
finance literature has only received limited attention within studies on key intra-
organisational decisions, such as that to venture abroad.  In seeking to address this lacuna, 
this study evaluates external risk and FDI choices, focusing on sovereign risk and financial 
sector stability, and supplementing earlier IB work that has considered political, fiscal, or 
industry risk, as well as public policies. 
 
The GFC itself clearly affected FDI inflows (Nielsen et al., 2017) and perhaps, more than any 
other event in recent history, heightened investor awareness of vulnerabilities in the financial 
system, particularly the banking system as well as sustainable government finances. Both 
themes dominated the debate over the past years and will continue to stay on the agenda. A 
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commonly employed indicator in international financial markets is sovereign risk, measuring 
as it does a country’s ability capacity to finance its sovereign debt and underpinning the 
pricing of financial instruments such as corporate bonds (Chen et al., 2013). Indeed, there is 
some nascent work in the finance literature showing that sovereign credit ratings are 
significant drivers of FDI (Cai et al., 2018). However, sovereign risk is determined by a wide 
range of macroeconomic vulnerabilities (see Poghosyan, 2012) and does not simply capture 
financial market risk.     
 
More focused measures of the stability of each country’s financial system are likely provided 
by the regulatory capital held by the banking system, particularly given its contemporary 
policy attention. In this paper, we hypothesize that financial market stability or bank-related 
risk is an important factor for FDI. Appealing to a new combination of institutional risk 
aversion and institutional affinity, we suggest that (i) higher holdings of regulatory capital 
will lead to increased risk aversion on behalf banks and consequently less lending, 
particularly to riskier, overseas ventures and (ii) affinity and familiarity ensure that financing 
to international MNEs is sought from and primarily provided by, home country institutions. 
As a corollary, FDI will be particularly sensitive to regulatory capital measures in origin 
countries but much less so to those in host countries, given the relative irrelevance of host 
country lending institutions to MNEs.        
 
To test our hypotheses empirically we choose to focus on the time span after the GFC (i.e., 
post-2008) examining the inflows and outflows of FDI to and from European Monetary 
Union (EMU) countries and the rest of the world. This emphasis on EMU countries allows us 
to improve our identification strategy (i.e., our approach to isolating explanatory variables) as 
we are able to mute the central bank transmission channel as all EMU countries face the same 
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monetary policy. Additionally, during this period incentives regarding FDI were likely 
predominantly influenced by considerations related to sovereign risk and financial stability. 
Specifically, in the aftermath of the GFC, worries about fiscal sustainability in the euro area 
intensified (Afonso et al., 2018). A full-blown sovereign debt crisis ensued, which started 
from Greece in autumn 2009 and gradually engulfed the whole of the EMU, particularly the 
so-called periphery economies (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). The European sovereign debt 
crisis has thus dominated the policy and business agenda in recent years and triggered a series 
of unconventional measures by the European Central Bank (ECB) to put an end to the crisis. 
However, we know relatively little, theoretically or empirically, about the effect of such 
financial instability on FDI flows and the rest of the paper will address such issues.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we report a detailed overview of 
the theory on the risks affecting FDI and we outline the hypotheses of the paper. In Section 3, 
we provide an exhaustive description of our dataset, and of the underlying literature justifying 
our choices. In Section 4, we explain the proposed empirical strategy, whose results are 
disclosed in Section 5. In Section 6, we draw the discussion and conclusion, highlighting 
what we can take away from our analysis. Eventually, in Section 7, we provide additional 
details on the composition of our dataset and on some tests that we performed to check the 
robustness of our results.  
 
2. Risk and FDI: Theoretical and Hypotheses Framework 
2.1. Classic Perspectives 
The early literature on the internationalisation process argued central to it was risk mitigation 
(Liesch et al., 2014).  Again, it has been argued that risk aversion represents a key factor in 
venturing abroad. Indeed, in a classic 1976 article, Rugman (1976) found that firms that with 
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larger overseas operations were more successful in mitigating risk. Underlying this was an 
assumption that there are a range of contextual factors that may intensify or mitigate risk, that 
are encountered in both the country of origin and domicile. 
  
Over 25 years ago, Miller (1992) noted that the IB literature’s focus on external risk 
concentrates on a limited number of categories, which could be loosely divided into internal 
or external factors (ibid.).  The former may encompass not only shortfalls in capabilities or 
processes, but also governance and the nature of corporate indebtedness (Betschinger, 2015).  
In terms of the latter, key concerns have been political or foreign exchange variables, and at 
the industry level issues such as technological change (Miller, 1992); although recent work 
has also focused on the uncertainties introduced by various contextual factors, such as 
institutional distance (Hernandez and Nieto, 2015).   Again, in terms of government policy, 
risk may range from changes in macro-economic policy to the relative provision of public 
goods (Narula, 2015; Buckley, 2016a). There are a wide range of firm specific uncertainties 
(e.g. labour, raw materials, production, liability, credit, and behavioural issues) (Miller 1992). 
 
The internalisation approach linked the international expansion of firms to efforts to 
internalise markets, in order to mitigate external market imperfections (Buckley and Casson 
2015). Firms will expand until the costs of internalisation outweigh the benefits; importantly, 
after taking all other factors into account, firms will seek out the most cost effective location1 
(ibid.).  As risk is about uncertainties in costs and advantages, assessments of risk are central 
to international expansion (ibid.; Buckley, 2016b). Over time, internalisation theory has 
identified an increasing range of potential risk factors, including loss of technological 
advantages and imperfect knowledge which in turn, have fed into a broad body of literature 
                                                 
1 For an excellent survey on the literature related to location choice of FDI see Nielsen et al., (2017).   
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on FDI choices (Buckley, 2018).  In turn, risk can be mitigated via corporate structures and 
diversification (ibid.).  Recent work has linked knowledge, networks and culture, as well as 
individual and group decision making with risk; in other words, the impact of risk is seen as 
something that is influenced by, and interacts with, other factors in a dynamic fashion (Liesch 
et al., 2014). Again, Buckley (2016a) argues that firms do not exhibit consistent risk 
preferences: it is something that is dynamic and adjusts to both external and internal 
developments. 
 
Early research work on risk in the international domain suggested that it concerned 
situational or organisational challenges that had, in some manner to be evaded or 
accommodated (Rugman, 1976). More recent work from the entrepreneurship perspective 
suggested that rather than being risk averse, there is a variation in relative risk tolerance (Dai 
et al., 2014; Zander et al. 2015). Indeed, it was initially held that international enterprise was 
risk seeking, although later work has shifted the emphasis to opportunity seeking (Liesch et 
al, 2014). Other recent research suggested that large MNEs possess more slack resources and 
other options than small entrepreneurial firms; in other words, the risk premium was lower 
(Liesch et al, 2014).   In turn, this would suggest that entrepreneurial firms may be more, 
rather than less, risk adverse (ibid.). Rather than directly linking entrepreneurial orientation to 
either risk aversion or risk propensity, Cavulkil and Knight (2016) concluded that 
entrepreneurial firms balance opportunity and risk. 
 
In reviewing the present state of knowledge, Buckley (2016a) argues that the conceptual 
treatment of risk remains work in progress: above all, this reflects the challenges of linking 
enterpreneurship and internalisation theory. At the same time, it should be recognised that 
these different strands of thinking are not necessarily contradictory or mutually exclusive; the 
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challenge is promoting an appropriate synthesis. Recent accounts have added the 
complexities of managerial decision making into the mix, and the psychological basis thereof 
(Buckley 2016a). The latter highlights the recent behavioural turn in analysing risk. This 
would echo Dai et al. (2014) who suggest that the individual dimensions of entrepreneurship 
and the decision-making process behind it will mould a firm’s relative appetite for risk taking 
across international boundaries. Based on experimental data, Kraus et al. (2015) concluded 
that risk assessments were primarily based on distance criteria, reflecting awareness as to the 
limitations of knowledge and understanding of different contexts.  Again, Giambona et al. 
(2017) argue that it is not just political risk per se, but how managers perceive it, that will 
influence organisational decision making; as much as half of MNEs will avoid investments 
on account of perceptions of risk. They further suggest that risk aversion is more likely when 
agency issues are more pronounced (ibid.). Common ground is a broad consensus that risk is 
multifaceted, and although there are variations in organisational decision making, structural 
and contextual variations in risk will have far reaching choices in the scale and scope of 
MNEs expansion. 
 
2.1.1. Risk and Institutions 
A further strand of work has linked FDI trends to institutional quality (Wood et al., 2016).   
As institutions regulate social and economic transactions, risk would be seen something as 
stemming from incorrect or ineffective sets of regulations (Peng et al., 2008).  Hence, Huang 
et al. (2015) concluded that firms are less likely to be affected by risks when underlying 
institutions are strong2.  De Morgantes and Allers (1996) concluded that external risk 
mitigating strategies adopted by MNEs tended to be ad hoc, possibly owing to a recognition 
of the complexities entailed in taking account of wider social and political circumstances.  
                                                 
2 Although a potentially contrary view is presented by Kolstad and Wiig (2012) who stress that Chinese FDI is 
attracted, in part, to countries with low quality institutions but sizeable natural resources. 
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Again, this is not to deny the importance of individual decision making, and how actors may 
impact back on structures, but rather that the range of strategic choices open to actors is 
moulded by contextual circumstances. 
 
Underlying much of the existing comparative institutional work is the assumption that 
institutions are relatively closely coupled (Lane and Wood, 2009). This would raise two 
issues. The first is the assumption of path dependence; if institutional regimes are tightly knit, 
then changing a system is particularly challenging. For example, corporate law represents the 
product of a complex range of historical circumstances; this makes for long continuities that 
may be resistant to change (Wood et al., 2016). However, this does not mean that institutions 
are immutable; actors will constantly work to adjust the system to suit their specific needs 
and problems (Hall, 2018).  Hence, politics is closely bound up with structural effects (ibid.).   
Again, within structural constraints, governments may follow distinct ideological paths, 
leading to policy shifts, which may be more or less risky for investors (Roe and Vallero, 
2016). Hence, institutions, risk and politics are seen as closely interlinked.   
 
2.1.2. Applied Evidence from Finance 
Indeed, the finance literature has tended to take sovereign yields as a proxy for political risk.  
Even though this may be not unproblematic, in that other risks may be included in valuation 
analysis leading to potential double counting, it still recognises the relationship between 
structural features and politics (Bekaert et al., 2016). However, two issues emerge, one at the 
applied, and one at the conceptual level.  Firstly, recent years have seen a trend for national 
governments to disengage themselves from monetary policy and financial sector regulation, 
placing an increasingly strong emphasis on central bank independence (Fernandez-Albertos, 
2015). In other words, many governments have chosen to place such policies at arm’s length 
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(Bodea and Hicks, 2014). In other words, an entire policy area has become placed beyond 
politics, even if this may be contested by emerging political actors and figures.  In turn, this 
will make external lobbying of politicians less effective; firms have to take policy as a given, 
rather than something that can be amended through political activities. For example, within 
the Eurozone, national governments have effectively ceded a great deal of control over 
monetary policy and financial stability issues, and this has eroded their policy tools available 
in managing debt and economic growth.  Again, this impacts on debt; central bank 
independence means governments cannot solve problems simply by printing more money, 
and, in turn, this means that the former will have a more predictable, if at times, unpalatable, 
set of consequences. Moreover, if banks are asked to hold more regulatory capital, this will 
likely have a detrimental impact on the amount lent to firms (De Goede, 2004; Flinders and 
Buller, 2006; Dovis et al., 2016).   
 
2.1.3. Emerging Issues 
In exploring how MNEs respond to banking risk, in the light of the potential uncoupling of 
monetary and fiscal policy, and in terms of relative willingness to risk their own or borrowed 
money through new FDI, this study aims to shed light not just on how contextual effects 
shape MNE assessments of risks, but how this may potentially impact back on contexts. At a 
theoretical level, although loose institutional coupling is often seen as a function of 
institutional shortfalls (Lane and Wood, 2009), the partial decoupling of reserve banking 
from the other range of state functions represents a product of deliberate policy design.  What 
this means is that although state related risk is often depicted as bound up with politics  
(Giambona et al. 2017), a dimension of key nation state specific risks has been, at least 
partially removed from the hands of politicians (Flinders and Buller, 2006). This does not 
mean that the matter is irrevocably settled; more than twenty years ago, there were calls for 
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assessments of financial risk to be repoliticised (De Goede, 2004) and, indeed more recently, 
this has been squarely on the agenda of populist politicians (Dovis et al., 2016).   
 
Where does this leave national and bank debt?  On the one hand, the former may represent 
policy choices and the latter regulatory lapses by governments, which represent the product 
of conventional political processes (see Haggard and Kaufman, 2018; Sandbu, 2018).  On the 
other hand, with the exception of Greece (where other issues, such as excessive defence 
spending intruded – see Wood et al., 2015), the post-2008 peripheral Eurozone sovereign 
debt crisis was largely a product of bank debt being nationalised. Although it was potentially 
within the grasp of governments to refuse to do so (as the case of Iceland would evidence), 
the overwhelming pressures was towards assuming this burden, removing the decision 
making around this from the normal sphere of political debate (Sandbu, 2018). Later, 
democratically elected governments that sought to challenge or reverse such decisions almost 
invariably were unable to do so after attaining office. In other words, this would represent an 
example of structurally induced risks which at the same time were depoliticised.  There are 
two major implications for understanding FDI. The first is that these stand distinct from risks 
that are more closely coupled with quotidian social and political events; hence, the normal 
tools open to MNEs for ameliorating risks, such as forging ties with local actors and lobbying 
may be less effective (c.f. Mbalyohere et al., 2016).  The second is that, as noted above, any 
process of depoliticisation is both difficult to reverse, yet reversible; this may result in 
extreme political reactions, which will greatly exacerbate the risks faced by MNEs (Dovis et 
al., 2016). In this paper, we place two structural but systemically depoliticised risk factors – 
sovereign yields and financial sector regulatory capital – at the heart of our analysis, 
complementing earlier studies of external risk that have focused on areas that were assumed 
to be more closely subject to the political sphere.   
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As noted above, in understanding FDI choices, the IB literature has been influenced by the 
corporate finance literature (and vice versa) (Goergen et al., 2017), but much less use has 
been made of insights - and analytical approaches - from other areas of finance. This paper 
furthermore seeks to fill this lacuna, through taking account of risk factors and analytical 
approaches not normally encompassed in the IB literature. As Buckley et al. (2018) note, 
relative ease of borrowing and associated bank debt has implications not only in determining 
destination choices, but also in facilitating outward FDI; hence we compare country of origin 
and host factors. At least four main strands of relevant finance literature can be identified. 
First, studies on the determinants of euro-area sovereign bond yield spreads (vs. German 
bunds), which are commonly viewed a key indicator of the crisis’ intensity (Arghyrou and 
Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth and Erdogan, 2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018). Second, studies 
that investigate the role of banking risk in transforming the global financial crisis into the 
sovereign debt crisis, and the nexus between banking risk and sovereign risk (De Bruyckere 
et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014; Delatte et al., 2017). Third, studies on the relationship 
between sovereign bond yield spreads and the investor base. These commonly examine 
foreign vs. domestic holdings of sovereign bonds across different classes of investors, and the 
factors that drive them (Arslanalp and Tsuda, 2012; Acharya and Steffen, 2015; Cruces and 
Trebesch, 2013; Battistini et al., 2014). Finally, a related strand focuses on portfolio capital 
flows involving the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis (Beck et al., 2016). 
 
2.2. Hypothesis development 
Our work draws on, and synthesizes, the extant IB and finance literature together in the 
context of FDI flows and risk. Beginning from the idea that monetary and financial sector 
policy has become depoliticised and therefore partially uncoupled from other state functions, 
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we suggest that MNEs will be relatively more sensitive to sovereign and bank-related risks. 
In terms of sovereign risk, increases in either origin or host country measures, are likely to 
decrease the FDI of MNEs. Therefore, our first hypothesis reads: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The greater the origin country’s sovereign risk, the lower is the volume of 
inward FDI. 
 
From the viewpoint of the origin country this is consistent with a stronger motive for 
companies to engage in less risk-taking and accumulate more cash holdings – precautionary 
motives (see Akguc and Choi, 2013). Different precautionary motives have been explored by 
the finance literature, such as higher uncertainty about future cash flows (Bacchetta and 
Benhima, 2014), or about the future macro-economic conditions (Gao and Grinstein, 2014).  
Analogously, recent work has identified higher cash holdings and less investment generally 
due to financial crises (Campello et al., 2010; Pinkowitz et al., 2012; Song and Lee, 2014). 
With respect to host countries, we hypothesise that:  
 
Hypothesis 1b: The greater the host country’s sovereign risk, the lower is the volume of 
inward FDI. 
 
As far as the host country is concerned, our hypothesis is consistent with existing evidence 
which uses sovereign credit ratings as a proxy for sovereign risk and shows that rating 
changes affect investment (Chen et al., 2013) and FDI inflows (Cai et al., 2018).  We opt to 
measure sovereign risk using long-term sovereign yields, which provide a market-based, and 
relative to credit ratings a less sticky, and more timely and responsive proxy (see Barroso, 
2010 and DeVries and De Haan, 2016). This hypothesis also coheres with previous studies on 
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the impact of host countries economic fundamentals on inward FDI (Cai et al, 2018; Bevan 
and Estrin, 2004; Bellak et al., 2009; Wernick et al., 2009; Dellis et al., 2017; for a review see 
Antonakakis and Tondl, 2012). 
 
The impact of bank-related risk can be interpreted through a “leverage channel”, whereby 
firms borrow from banks to finance investment, including FDI. According to this argument, 
credit availability will be an important determinant of FDI. The importance of credit cycles 
for the real economy (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002; Chen et al., 
2012) has led to attempts by policymakers to tame them. Regulatory capital holdings 
constitute an important tool in the arsenal of the regulators. They have increased since the 
recent financial crisis, to improve the resilience of banks to future shocks. Recent empirical 
evidence demonstrates that higher capital requirements are associated with decreased bank 
lending (Bridges et al., 2014; Fraisse et al., 2017; Aiyar et al., 2015).  Thus, we can 
hypothesise that: 
 
Hypothesis 2a:  The lower the origin country’s bank risk-taking, as a consequence of higher 
capital requirements, the lower will be the volume of inward FDI. 
 
As a matter of fact, an increase in regulatory capital holdings is likely to lead to weakened 
investment activity via less credit availability.3 This effect will be stronger for firms wishing 
to invest overseas where imperfect knowledge considerations are greater. Moreover, it may 
well matter more in FDI origin countries, where a closer institutional affinity and familiarity 
between banks and MNEs will see more FDI financing take place than in host markets. 
                                                 
3 Arguments related to the importance of credit availability for M&As, also called brownfield FDI, have been 
put forward by Harford (2005), among others. As described by Halford (2005), brownfield FDI could depend on 
industry, technological and regulatory shocks, which in the latter case certainly played a role with Basel 
regulation on banks’ capital requirements, but also on the availability of “capital liquidity to accommodate the 
asset reallocation” (Halford, 2005:530). 
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Consequently, bank-related risk measures are likely to present an asymmetric effect across 
origin and host countries. Thus, assuming that the financing of FDI in the origin country is 
predominantly carried out via local banks, our hypothesis reads that: 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Changes in the amount of capital allocated by host countries’ banks as 
buffer for their risky assets, has no effect on inward FDI. 
 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable used in our paper is the bilateral FDI holdings of 112 direct investor 
countries in the Euro Area (EA). In a similar vein to Beck et al. (2016), we compose our 
dataset using end-of-the-year bilateral FDI in the Euro Area, collected from the IMF 
Coordinated Foreign Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) between 2009 and 2016.  
 
The CDIS is a dataset published by the IMF in 2010 and updated on an annual basis. It has 
been created to allow a global analysis of cross-country linkages. In the dataset, the IMF 
provides data on bilateral direct investment holdings of more than 100 countries, participating 
in the survey. Moreover, disaggregating countries’ FDI positions using their immediate 
counterpart, the CDIS data allows for a cross-country and over time comparison of FDI 
positions (Damgaard and Elkjaer, 2017). Consequently, we are in a position to observe 
bilateral FDI flows, disentangling effects and drivers of origin and host countries. This allows 
for a better identification of effects as compared to standard approaches used in the literature 
which implicitly assumes that host characteristics are the main drivers.  
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To emphasise then, the main advantage of this dataset is that it enables us to disentangle 
origin and destination of FDI flows. As highlighted in Beck et al. (2016), the understanding 
of the causes and origins of these flows is of crucial importance for policy makers. For 
instance, while intra Euro Area flows can be easily managed by the ECB, outside FDI flows – 
particularly ‘sudden stops’ in FDI flows – could potentially undermine central banks’ goals 
and targets. On the other hand, as pointed out by the authors, intra-EA capital flows can be 
more easily managed by the ECB through Target balances and variations in official flows. 
 
Of course, there are some caveats to mention related to the use of this data. Firstly, FDI data 
from the CDIS is unadjusted for valuation effects. Secondly, to increase the 
representativeness of the data, CDIS include data on both listed and unlisted firms, however, 
different valuation methods, especially for unlisted firms, can generate significant 
geographical asymmetries in the data (Damgaard and Elkjaer, 2017). Thirdly, data from the 
CDIS is not adjusted for exchange rate effects. Therefore, changes in stock positions could 
potentially reflect EUR/USD exchange rate movements. As Beck et al., (2016: 452) notes, 
“Purging these valuation effects from the stock positions would require detailed knowledge 
about the currency and maturity composition of the holdings, on which data do not exist.” 
Finally, as the dataset discloses FDI by immediate counterpart economy, it also includes 
transactions performed by MNEs through Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), often for tax 
avoidance purposes or financial engineering (Dellis et al., 2017; Damgaard and Elkjaer, 
2017). This effect might be germane in smaller countries which have relatively large financial 
sectors. 
 
Therefore, as remarked on by Beck et al. (2016) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2010), ideally we 
would use a panel dataset collecting consolidated bilateral flows, adjusted for exchange rate 
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effects and recorded on a residence (locational) basis, where “the ‘ultimate risk’ basis implies 
that the borrower is the entity ultimately responsible for the liability” (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 
2010: 21), but such data does not exist. Thus, to minimise the aforementioned biases and 
avoid data distortions, following Beck et al. (2016) we exclude countries considered major 
tax heavens and smaller countries with proportionately large financial sectors.4 Finally, to 
mitigate the impact of the exchange rate channel, we build our baseline model ‘in levels’ and 
test the robustness of our results to economic growth, using GDP per capita in USD. Note 
that Table 1 presents summary statistics for our dependent variable and risk measures for 
GIIPS (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and non-GIIPS Euro Area countries.5  
  
  
                                                 
4 For a detailed overview see Appendix 1.B. 
5 Appendix 2.A provides a pairwise graphical analysis of FDI and risk variables. 
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Table 1.  
Table 1 contains the summary statistics for our dependent variable as well as for our different risk measures on a 
country by country basis for a greater level of granularity. Panel 1 discloses descriptive statistics on FDI inflows 
received by EA countries between 2009 and 2016. Panel 2 contains descriptive statistics on Regulatory Capital 
held by EA banks as a portion of their Risk-Weighted assets. In Panel 3 we report descriptive statistics on 10-
year sovereign bond yields of EA countries. Panel 4 shows descriptive statistics on EA banks NPL ratio. Finally, 
Panel 5 displays descriptive statistics on EA banks Z-Score. For all the Panels, we report statistics on GIIPS and 
non-GIIPS EA countries separately. 
 
GIIPS Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Greece GRC 115 405.877 1,085.274 -1,633.905 5,358.714
Ireland IRL 120 10,968.990 36,481.940 -23,034.350 154,667.400
Italy ITA 120 17,134.910 27,606.310 7.640 124,198.700
Portugal PRT 120 1,563.345 4,669.577 -8,047.017 24,486.880
Spain ESP 120 6,962.184 10,769.410 -13,549.280 38,622.490
Non-GIIPS EA Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Austria AUT 120 5,389.935 8,987.756 -841.423 35,873.030
Belgium BEL 120 20,817.410 46,705.070 -3,770.425 225,544.700
Cyprus CYP 119 2,095.746 5,230.197 -5,192.275 27,625.580
Estonia EST 120 85.241 281.451 -76.971 1,962.515
Finland FIN 120 3,085.604 6,469.908 -1,011.345 31,934.490
France FRA 120 34,176.300 50,160.460 45.023 178,235.400
Germany DEU 120 27,228.140 47,179.820 87.096 242,784.100
Latvia LVA 119 41.694 112.753 -40.353 649.823
Netherlands NLD 120 55,631.900 64,693.200 0.000 248,562.200
Slovak Republic SVK 120 79.657 383.796 -602.303 2,907.801
Slovenia SVN 114 13.949 116.841 -246.902 1,140.897
GIIPS Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Greece GRC 120 13.108 2.527 9.569 16.947
Ireland IRL 120 19.988 4.480 12.780 26.941
Italy ITA 120 13.295 1.018 11.650 14.789
Portugal PRT 120 11.807 1.308 9.780 13.327
Spain ESP 120 13.031 1.198 11.586 14.849
Non-GIIPS EA Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Austria AUT 120 16.500 1.027 15.026 17.976
Belgium BEL 120 18.389 0.637 17.262 19.305
Cyprus CYP 120 13.351 2.908 7.343 16.943
Estonia EST 120 24.721 5.969 18.607 35.653
Finland FIN 120 17.455 3.463 14.188 23.337
France FRA 120 14.804 2.054 12.324 17.752
Germany DEU 120 17.423 1.413 14.820 19.160
Latvia LVA 120 17.578 2.736 13.724 21.823
Netherlands NLD 120 16.481 3.091 13.478 22.375
Slovak Republic SVK 120 15.501 2.142 12.571 17.982
Slovenia SVN 120 14.458 3.294 11.320 19.155
Panel 1: EA FDI inflow (mln $)
Panel 2: EA Regulatory Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
GIIPS Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Greece GRC 120 10.959 5.244 5.174 22.498
Ireland IRL 120 4.352 2.771 0.736 9.602
Italy ITA 120 3.710 1.444 1.488 5.493
Portugal PRT 120 5.755 2.921 2.423 10.548
Spain ESP 120 3.741 1.542 1.393 5.845
Non-GIIPS EA Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Austria AUT 120 2.184 1.195 0.377 3.937
Belgium BEL 120 2.505 1.311 0.476 4.233
Cyprus CYP 120 5.350 1.061 3.773 7.000
Estonia EST 30 6.873 0.920 5.968 7.778
Finland FIN 120 2.005 1.106 0.363 3.739
France FRA 120 2.226 1.090 0.467 3.649
Germany DEU 120 1.673 1.042 0.090 3.223
Latvia LVA 120 5.064 4.029 0.534 12.358
Netherlands NLD 120 2.000 1.108 0.292 3.687
Slovak Republic SVK 120 3.029 1.567 0.543 4.707
Slovenia SVN 120 3.865 1.644 1.149 5.812
GIIPS Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Greece GRC 120 24.055 11.623 7.000 36.647
Ireland IRL 120 17.357 5.453 9.800 25.709
Italy ITA 120 14.334 3.371 9.400 18.064
Portugal PRT 120 9.325 2.821 4.800 11.962
Spain ESP 120 6.486 1.714 4.100 9.381
Non-GIIPS EA Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Austria AUT 120 2.885 0.359 2.300 3.473
Belgium BEL 120 3.578 0.476 2.799 4.245
Cyprus CYP 120 27.329 18.361 4.500 48.676
Estonia EST 120 2.745 1.766 0.870 5.375
Finland FIN 60 0.550 0.050 0.500 0.600
France FRA 120 4.112 0.227 3.759 4.495
Germany DEU 105 2.773 0.442 1.980 3.300
Latvia LVA 120 9.039 4.703 3.652 15.934
Netherlands NLD 120 2.912 0.239 2.531 3.227
Slovak Republic SVK 120 5.222 0.403 4.444 5.836
Slovenia SVN 120 10.136 3.351 5.071 15.180
GIIPS Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Greece GRC 120 4.290 2.160 0.016 6.958
Ireland IRL 120 6.673 4.605 0.055 13.619
Italy ITA 120 12.703 1.836 10.031 15.691
Portugal PRT 120 10.595 2.496 7.667 15.538
Spain ESP 120 19.277 2.465 15.171 22.833
Non-GIIPS EA Country Code Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
Austria AUT 120 24.207 1.270 22.442 26.454
Belgium BEL 120 13.899 2.703 9.333 17.455
Cyprus CYP 120 7.264 3.000 1.999 11.892
Estonia EST 120 6.603 2.304 0.995 8.549
Finland FIN 120 9.602 2.450 7.361 15.115
France FRA 120 17.619 2.176 14.954 21.240
Germany DEU 120 18.985 3.633 14.001 24.173
Latvia LVA 120 5.846 1.564 2.907 7.455
Netherlands NLD 120 8.563 1.729 5.944 11.305
Slovak Republic SVK 120 17.266 1.004 15.365 18.292
Slovenia SVN 120 2.431 1.283 -0.241 4.062
Panel 3: 10-years Sovereign Bonds Yields
Panel 4: Non-Performing Loans/Total Gross Loans
Panel 5: Bank Z-Score
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3.2. Core risk-taking variables 
 As said, we focus on specific risks for MNEs involved in FDI. Particularly, we look at 
financial and political stability, arising from concerns about high sovereign indebtedness and 
a fragile banking sector with implications for the overall economy and consequently on the 
expected investment return (Acharya et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 1: Sovereign risk assessment 
 
 
 
Notes. Average 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields of major non-EA countries (MJ-NEA), Euro Area Periphery 
(GIIPS) and non-Periphery EA countries (non-GIIPS-EA). In our paper, we use this indicator to measure EA 
sovereign risk. For a detailed list of the countries included in each of the aforementioned categories, see Table 1.
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Figure 2: Banking risk measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Averages of Regulatory Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets, Bank Z-Score and Non-Performing Loans/Total Gross Loans of major non-EA countries (MJ-NEA), Euro 
Area Periphery (GIIPS) and non-Periphery EA countries (non-GIIPS-EA). In our paper, we use this indicator to measure the risk of the EA banking sector. For a detailed list 
of the countries included in each of the aforementioned categories, see Table 1. 
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Specifically, to measure sovereign risk we use 10-year government bond yields. This is a 
widely agreed proxy for sovereign risk (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth and 
Erdogan, 2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018). Recent work (i.e., Cai et al., 2018) has examined 
the relation between sovereign credit ratings and FDI. While using credit ratings is a 
reasonable measure, we believe that using sovereign bond yields for our purposes is a 
superior approach as it reflects the market perspective and should react more quickly to 
changes in relevant information – see Barroso (2010) and DeVries and De Haan (2016). 
Again, to maximise our sample coverage, we merge data from IMF International Financial 
Statistics (IMF IFS), OECD Financial Statistics, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, and 
Bloomberg.   
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of our sovereign risk measure. We observe a decline outside the 
EA zone and for non-GIIPS countries. For GIIPS countries, sovereign risk increased 
dramatically until mid-2012. After the extraordinary commitment from the ECB to stabilise 
the EMU, spreads began to fall. They remain, however, at elevated levels by the end of our 
sample period. Consequently, there is substantial variation that we can exploit. 
 
As proxy for bank risk taking, we opt for using Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets. 
It measures the aggregate amount of core capital allocated by a country’s banking sector as a 
buffer on their risky assets. This variable is commonly used in the banking literature to assess 
the stability of the banking sector (see De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014; 
Delatte et al., 2017) and reflects policymakers attempts to address excessive bank risk taking 
through greater capital buffers. In order to maximise the country sample, we combined data 
from the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators and World Bank Global Financial 
Development DataBank. 
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As we can see from Figure 2, after the GFC, greater worldwide regulation of the banking 
sector led banks globally to increase the amount of capital allocated as a buffer for their risky 
assets. The new regulatory frameworks have considerably shrunk the credit availability of 
banks, hence resulting in lower bank risk taking.  
 
3.3. Additional risk measures and main controls 
For robustness reasons, we re-estimate our models using different bank risk measures. We 
select two popular measures that are frequently used to measure the outstanding risk of 
banks: ‘Banks Z-Score’ and nonperforming loans over total gross loans (denoted ‘NPL 
ratio’). The Z-Score, developed by Edward Altman in 1968, captures the probability of 
default of a firm. This measure has been applied by academics and practitioners to several 
entities and contexts, but most importantly, for capturing the financial distress of banks 
(Altman, 2018; ECB, 2016). As the other measures, the Z-Score is included in the ‘Financial 
Institutions: Stability’ indicators of the World Bank Global Financial Development DataBank 
and it is used to predict the probability of default of the banking sector of a given economy. 
Its value is computed by the World Bank as the ratio of a country’s banks capital buffers 
(capitalisation and returns) to the volatility of their returns. Therefore, the higher this 
measure, the higher is the amount of capital available to banks to sustain market risk, and the 
lower is the default risk.   
 
With respect to NPLs, according to the IMF, NPLs affect bank lending through three main 
channels: (i) profitability, as NPLs generate less income for banks and require more 
provisions, reducing their net income; (ii) capital, as they require banks to make an allocation 
of much greater capital; (iii) funding costs, because of the higher funding costs that banks 
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incur as a result of their impaired balance sheet (Aiyar et al., 2015). Higher NPLs impact the 
private sector, particularly in countries relying heavily on bank financing such as within the 
Euro Area, making access to credit harder and more expensive, especially for SMEs (ibid.).  
 
In Figure 2, we observe a drastic increase in the NPL ratio. This trend, especially pronounced 
for GIIPS countries, reached its highest in the period of the sovereign debt crisis and 
subsequently stabilised around 2013. The implication of this graph is twofold: on the one 
hand, it highlights again the importance of the ‘regulator’ in improving banks’ safeness – as 
the ECB Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and Quantitative Easing (QE) programs 
have reduced GIIPS countries exposure to NPLs; on the other hand, the graph also supports 
the hypothesis of higher risk aversion of host countries banks, arising from regulatory 
pressures and banks’ balance sheet deterioration. 
 
Finally, we include in our baseline model several additional control variables. In particular, 
we include standard gravity model variables, controlling for information frictions and 
transaction costs arising from the individual FDI bilateral transactions. To further robustify 
our results, we estimate additional models where we added relevant macroeconomic variables 
and fixed effects. The inclusion of gravity model variables is a standard practice in the 
literature on bilateral cross-border flows, especially when studying FDI. Portes and Rey 
(2005) provide evidence that gravity variables proxying country size and transaction costs – 
arising from informational frictions differences in technology – might explain up to 83% of 
bilateral cross-country equity flows (Martin and Rey, 2004; Portes and Rey, 2005). Daude 
and Fratzscher (2008) confirm that FDI is much more dependent on informational frictions 
than portfolio flows. With respect to gravity variables, we follow Beck et al. (2016) amongst 
others and include a dummy variable identifying whether the analysed countries share the 
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same official language and control for the physical distance between the countries (see 
Appendix 1.A).  
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
To analyse the effects of risk and financial stability on FDI, we build a panel dataset 
including all available bilateral holdings of origin and host countries. Specifically, the dataset 
contains information on the end-of-the-year positions of 112 foreign direct investor countries 
in 16 EA countries6 over the period ranging from 2009 to 2016. We take the logarithm of our 
dependent variable, as well as our proxy variables for sovereign and banking risk, and 
equations (1) and (2) below show our chosen regression specification:  
 
 
log(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖ℎ,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖ℎ + 𝛽2 log(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖ℎ) +  𝛽3 log (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖ℎ,𝑡         
(1)          
 
log(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖ℎ,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖ℎ + 𝛽2 log(𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖ℎ) +  𝛽3 log (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ,𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖ℎ,𝑡        
(2)                             
                    
 
In the regression equations, i is the country of the foreign direct investor (or origin country), 
while h denotes the host country. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚_𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖ℎ is a dummy variable taking value of 1 if the 
country i and h share the same official language and zero otherwise. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖ℎ represents 
the physical distance between i and h. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 (or 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ,𝑡) is a proxy for  
banking or sovereign risk, either for the origin country (with the i subscript) or for the host 
country (with the h subscript). Finally, 𝜖𝑖ℎ,𝑡 represents the error term. We estimate (1) and (2) 
using a least squares approach with Huber-Eiker-White robust standard errors.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
                                                 
6 As in Beck et al. (2016), we consider all Euro Area (EA) countries with the exception of small countries with 
large financial sectors (i.e., Malta and Luxembourg) and Lithuania, as it joined the EA in 2015. 
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In this section, we present and discuss the estimation results of equations (1) and (2). Table 2 
contains our main specification where we focus on the two core risk variables – Regulatory 
Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets and 10-Year Sovereign Bond Yields. Given the bilateral nature 
of our data we estimate for each risk proxy, two equations (1) and (2), for the origin and host 
country risk, respectively. With this we can assess which kind of risk is relevant, i.e. whether 
the situation in the origin country or the host country matters in the same fashion for FDI. In 
Tables 3 and 4, we consider other measures of banking risk and split our sample into GIIPS 
and non-GIIPS countries.  
 
Considering Table 2 first of all, the included gravity variables are statistically significant and 
have the expected sign. In line with the previous literature (Beck et al.., 2016; Daude and 
Fratzscher, 2008; Martin and Rey, 2004; and Portes and Rey, 2005), standard gravity 
variables – proxying information and transaction costs – are important drivers of FDI flows. 
Sharing the same official language and high proximity, increase foreign direct investment.  
Dep. Variable
Constant
comm_lang
log(distance)
Observations
R-squared
log(Country 
Risk)
0.186
(2)
log(FDI)
14.670***
(0.718)
3.379***
(0.139)
-1.276***
(0.046)
-0.078
(0.800)
23.893***
(1)
log(FDI)
3.257***
(0.145)
-1.358***
(0.045)
-3.169***
10-year Sovereign Bond Yields
Origin country Host country
log(FDI)
(3) (4)
log(FDI)
Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets
Origin country Host country
-1.183***
(0.048) (0.047)
14.340*** 14.849***
(0.360) (0.366)
2.697*** 3.099***
Table 2 - Country Risk impact on inward and outward FDI volume
Country risk
Banking Risk measure Sovereign Risk measure
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.233 0.186
3,881 4,7935,110
(0.250) (0.209)
5,110
0.157
-1.224*** -0.888***
(0.063) (0.063)
(0.162) (0.147)
-0.981***
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5.1. Country risk impact on FDI  
Considering next the effect of the 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields, we can observe that the 
coefficients in both columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 are statistically significant and present a 
negative sign. This implies that higher sovereign risk, both domestically as well as in the host 
country, results in lower FDI in the Euro Area and confirms our hypotheses 1a and 1b in 
Section 2.2. Such a result is expected as an increase in either origin or host country measures, 
is likely to decrease the FDI of MNEs given a higher motive for companies to engage in less 
risk-taking and accumulate more cash holdings. Analogously, recent work has identified 
higher cash holdings and less investment generally due to financial crises (Song and Lee, 
2014). Notably when comparing the magnitude of the coefficient estimates in columns (3) 
and (4), we observe that the coefficient of the origin country is bigger than the coefficient of 
the host country. Hence, it appears that origin countries risk situation is more relevant than 
the host country and provides evidence on the key role held by banks in financing global FDI 
– via the so-called lending channel – discussed by the extant literature (see Bridges et al., 
2014; Fraisse et al., 2017; Aiyar et al, 2015; Bacchetta and Benhima, 2014; Halford, 2015).  
 
Continuing to focus on Table 2 and examining the ratio Regulatory Capital/Risk Weighted 
Assets (RC/RWA), the origin country coefficient estimate in column (1) is statistically 
significant and has negative sign, implying a reduction of FDI volume invested by MNEs. To 
the contrary, in column (2) we observe that the coefficient estimate capturing the situation of 
the host country is not significant. This confirms our hypotheses 2a and 2b; only origin 
country banking risk matters for the decision to invest in the host country. As discussed in 
Section 2.2., increases in regulatory capital holding are likely to lead to less credit 
availability, particularly for firms wishing to invest overseas where imperfect knowledge 
considerations are greater. Moreover, this appears to matter much more in origin countries, 
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where a closer institutional affinity and familiarity between banks and MNEs may well see 
more FDI financing take place than in host markets. 
 
5.2. Robustness 
In Table 3 below we include the other proxies for banking risk discussed previously in 
Section 3.3. Overall, our results and conclusions remain unaffected with further support 
provided for hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b. In particular, both for the Z-Score as well as for 
the NPL ratio, we confirm that the origin country’s, as opposed to the host country’s, banking 
risk situation matters for FDI decisions.   
 
Dep. Variable
Constant
comm_lang
log(distance)
Observations
R-squared
(0.619)
13.972***
0.160 0.157 0.161 0.158
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3 - Other Country Risk variables impact on inward and outward FDI volume
Banking Risk measures
5,110 5,110
(0.438) (0.430) (1.414) (1.865)
5,110 5,110
-1.284*** -1.273*** -1.322*** -1.276***
0.131
(0.046) (0.055) (0.052) (0.335)
Bank Z-Score Nonperforming Loans/Total Gross Loans
Origin Country Host country Origin country Host country
(0.182)
3.389*** 3.384*** 3.342*** 3.350***
(2) (3) (4)
log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI)
(1)
(0.139) (0.139) (0.589)
15.606*** 14.146*** 15.786***
-0.198*** 0.074 -0.187***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.187)
log(Country 
Risk)
 
 
 
Finally, we have a closer look at the EA countries and split the sample into GIIPS (i.e., 
stressed) and non-GIIPS (i.e., non-stressed) Euro Area countries. Given the sharper increase 
of sovereign risk for GIIPS countries over our sample period, the effect of such risk should be 
more pronounced in GIIPS countries than in non-GIIPS countries. Table 4 contains the 
30 
 
relevant estimation results. Again, our main results, support for our hypotheses and 
conclusions, remain unaffected. We confirm that banking risk and sovereign risk are both 
relevant. Banking risk is relevant for the origin country only, while sovereign risk is 
important for both origin and host country. Furthermore, and as expected, the coefficient 
estimates of our chosen country risk variables typically become larger in absolute magnitude 
in the GIIPS country sub-sample. For example, in Table 4, the estimated coefficient for origin 
country RC/RWA is -2.94 in the non-stressed (or non-GIIPS) sub-sample, whilst the 
equivalent coefficient in the stressed (or GIIPS) sub-sample is -3.74. Indeed, the sensitivity of 
FDI to country risk is greater in stressed GIIPS countries for both risk types than in the non-
GIIPS countries sub-sample. There is only one exception here for the coefficient of host 
country sovereign risk, which may again reflect the higher relevance of conditions in the 
origin country than in the host. Finally, note that several alternative specifications have been 
estimated, adding various controls and fixed effects. Results are qualitatively unaffected by 
these alterations and are available in Appendix 2.B.  
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Country risk
Dep. Variable
Constant
comm_lang
log(distance)
Observations
R-squared
log(Country 
Risk)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Origin Country Host country Origin Country Host country Origin Country Host country
log(FDI)
23.050*** 13.589*** 14.053*** 14.607*** 27.409*** 15.235*** 16.894*** 17.655***
log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI)
(0.768)
3.034*** 3.130*** 2.512*** 2.728*** 3.414*** 3.621*** 3.098*** 3.556***
(0.999) (0.873) (0.440) (0.452) (1.377) (1.341)
(0.243)
-1.354*** -1.262*** -0.981*** -1.157*** -1.547*** -1.489*** -1.226*** -1.510***
(0.178) (0.167) (0.191) (0.183) (0.246) (0.242)
(0.093)
-2.944*** 0.211 -1.146*** -1.136*** -3.739*** 0.491 -1.373*** -0.672***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058) (0.092) (0.095)
0.226 0.215 0.202 0.154
Country risk
Banking Risk measure Sovereign Risk measure
(0.383)
(0.090)
(0.283)
(0.710)
log(FDI)
Non-Stressed EA countries Stressed EA countries
Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets 10-year Sovereign Bonds' yields Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets 10-year Sovereign Bonds' yields
Origin Country Host country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Banking Risk measure Sovereign Risk measure
Table 4 - Country Risk impact on inward and outward FDI volume  (Stressed and Non-Stressed EA countries)
(0.101) (0.124)
3,450 3,450 2,677 3133 1,660 1,660 1,204 1,660
(0.309) (0.264) (0.078) (0.077) (0.421)
0.280 0.1670.188 0.165
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6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Particularly since the GFC, the stability of the financial system has come to the fore of both 
academic and policy thinking. Specifically, the recent emphasis on macro prudential policy - 
in other words, policy that recognizes the systemic risks inherent in large financial 
institutions - has resulted in new thinking. For example, in response to the wave of bank 
bailouts in the late 2000s, a range of regulatory policies have been implemented, often 
requiring banks to hold more capital on their balance sheets, in order to try and reduce the 
vulnerability of the financial system.  
 
It should be noted that the costs of macroprudential policy, rather than any potential benefit, 
of stabilising the financial architecture are often not considered, either in policy circles or the 
academic literature. In our paper, we evaluate such costs in the context of FDI. This type of 
financing can be an important factor in driving firm performance (Borin and Mancini, 2015) 
and countrywide economic growth7 (see, inter alios, Alfaro et al., 2010) through a variety of 
channels including technology transfer and increases in human capital and employment.  
 
A number of potential risk factors for FDI have been examined in the IB literature, including 
those arising from political, social, geographical, technological, regulatory and/or firm 
specific spheres (Narula, 2015). However, the financial sector has been less considered and 
consequently, the risks to FDI emanating from both, recent financial crises (e.g., the GFC and 
sovereign debt crisis) and any policy responses to these, have been underexplored.  
 
We focus on two measures of financial stability - sovereign yields and more explicit 
measures of bank behaviour such as regulatory capital. Furthermore, we discriminate 
                                                 
7 Note that Alfaro et al. (2010) show that positive economic growth externalities of FDI are in part, dependent 
on how well developed the host country’s financial markets.  
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between effects from the host country and the origin country. First, sovereign yields represent 
the market’s judgement on the ability of a country to service its national debt and as such 
encapsulate economic, political and financial risks. Of course, the GFC gave rise to increased 
government borrowing to support struggling banks in the Euro Area and elsewhere, the 
consequent increase in yields leading to the sovereign debt crisis. Relatedly, we hypothesise 
that FDI will respond negatively to upturns in sovereign yields across both origin and host 
countries, given that (i) an increase in origin country yield will likely encourage its own 
MNEs to engage in less risk-taking whilst (ii) an increase in host country yield will imply that 
other destinations appear more attractive. Our empirical work, using a panel of bilateral FDI 
holdings for 112 direct investor countries in the Euro Area (EA) from 2009 to 2016, strongly 
supports both these hypotheses. Moreover, in absolute magnitude, the sovereign risk of the 
origin country matters more than that of the host country, an interesting finding given the 
typical weight placed on the importance of the host country characteristics in attracting FDI.      
 
In terms of policy responses to recent financial crises, these often include requirements for 
financial institutions to hold more regulatory capital. Therefore, our second measure of 
financial stability is regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets; a measure employed 
previously in the banking literature to represent the stability of the banking sector (see Delatte 
et al., 2017). Drawing on and combining the IB and finance conceptualisations of institutional 
quality and risk aversion respectively, we suggest that banks’ institutional risk aversion will 
be heightened given an increase in regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets. In a practical 
sense, this will result in reduced bank lending in the aggregate and potentially, 
proportionately less overseas lending, which might be considered riskier. Furthermore, 
ceteris paribus, changes in regulatory capital in origin countries are more likely to affect FDI 
than comparable changes in host countries, assuming MNEs are more likely to finance their 
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operations from banks in their home country. This is an adaptation of the concept of 
institutional affinity (see Shukla and Cantwell, 2018), whereby cultural ties and familiarity 
lead to economic and financial ties.      
 
Our empirical work again confirms our ex-ante theorization. In particular, although increases 
in the origin country regulatory capital measure lead to decreases in FDI, changes in host 
country measures leave FDI unaffected. Strikingly, these results are robust to the use of other 
common proxy measures for bank-related risk: namely, bank Z-Score and the ratio of non-
performing loans to total gross loans. Additionally, when the Euro Area sample is separated 
into two subsamples representing non-stressed and stressed (i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain) countries, the reduction in FDI from origin countries experiencing higher 
bank risk, is clearly greater in the stressed case.  
 
Overall our theory and empirical results show that financial stability, both in origin and host 
countries, matters for FDI. We would encourage policymakers in countries that seek to attract 
FDI to not only be mindful of the domestic conditions that lead to lower sovereign risk but 
also to be cognisant of the changing financing environment that MNEs may face in their 
home countries. Host country schemes to support the financing of FDI by overseas MNEs 
may be appropriate but will need to be aware of the trust deficit that comes with lack of 
familiarity and affinity. Recent IB and cognate strands of literature have highlighted the 
extent to which FDI choices represent the outcome of both positive and negative sets of very 
different types institutional effects, rather than a single institutional feature over-shadowing 
all others (Buckley et al., 2018; Wood et al., 2016).  Approaches to risk will reflect both 
institutional affinity and aversion (c.f. Shukla and Cantwell, 2018). This study provides 
further illustration of the dynamics of such processes, focusing on the effects of variations in 
35 
 
bank-related risk, a key systemic feature where the range of regulatory choices is somewhat 
circumscribed. 
 
Finally, it is important to discuss that the areas of risk highlighted in this study – sovereign 
and bank – and their respective and interlinked regulatory structures have become relatively 
depoliticised given the rise of ‘independent’ central banks and supra-national policy setting 
frameworks, which constrain the range of policy options open to national governments. Our 
study highlights the potential costs and benefits of financial stability in the context of FDI. 
However, in a wider social context, the decoupling of institutions from other state functions 
and, in particular national oversight, may have wider political ramifications than simply 
where MNEs choose to invest, as evidenced by the contemporary rise of populist movements.      
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7. Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Dataset Description 
1.A – Data  
Inward FDI: Annual data on foreign countries’ FDI holdings in EA countries is collected 
from the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). From this dataset, we collected 
‘inward’ FDI positions in EA countries, cross-classified by economy of the immediate 
investor (see IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey Guide – 2015).  
 
Gravity Variables: Gravity variables of ‘Geographical Distance’ and ‘Common Official 
Language’ are instead collected from the ‘Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et 
L’Economie Mondiale (CHELEM)’ database, developed by the CEPII Research Center. The 
‘Geographical Distance’ is a dyadic dataset, disclosing many features for the reported country 
pairs, such as: geographical distance (in kilometres) between the capitals of most of the 
countries in the world, whether or not the countries share the same official language, whether 
the countries share colonization history, etc (see Meyer and Zignago, 2011).  
 
Country Risk Variables: Country Risk variables have been gathered the World Bank Global 
Financial Development Database and from IMF Financial Soundness Indicators Database 
(with the exception of the 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields, for which we used IMF IFS, 
supplemented for a few missing observations with OECD Financial Statistics, 
Oesterreichische NationalBank, and Bloomberg). The World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database is an extensive dataset gathering information on the functioning of the 
financial system. Among the information presented in this database, it reports statistics on: 
financial depth, financial services access, efficiency and stability (resilience) of the financial 
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system and of the institutions operating in it. Almost all our ‘Country Risk’ variables have 
been collected from the Financial Stability Section of this database. Additionally, the IMF 
Financial Soundness Indicators Database is also a comprehensive dataset providing statistics 
on financial system resilience. In particular, it contains granular information on: financial 
intermediaries’ stability, as well as detailed statistics on other entities such as financial and 
non-financial corporations. From the latter database, we collected data on banks’ regulatory 
capital to risk-weighted assets, that we then further supplemented using the World Bank 
Global Financial Development Database. 
 
GDP per capita: Annual data on GDP per capital has been obtained from World Bank 
Statistics. This database combines macro-economic data from the World Bank National 
Account database and from the OECD National Accounts data files. 
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1.B – Countries 
In our analysis we included a broad range of countries (i.e., 112 countries). The countries that 
we considered are all those voluntarily participating in the IMF Coordinated Direct 
Investment Survey (CDIS), with the exception of tax heavens, small countries with large 
financial centres or war zones. Specifically, below we report the detailed composition of our 
dataset: 
 
Countries included in the dataset: Within the Euro Area (EA), we considered all countries 
with the exception of Lithuania, as it joined the EA in 2015, Malta and Luxembourg. With 
respect to non-Euro Area countries, we consider: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Canada, Central African 
Republic, Chile, China, P.R. Mainland, Colombia, Congo, Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Islamic Republic of, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Republic of Kuwait, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Macedonia, FYR, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Republica 
Bolivariana de Vietnam, Yemen, Republic of Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix 2 – Additional analyses 
2.A – Pairwise graphical analysis of FDI and Country Risk variables  
2.A.1 – Logarithm of Euro Area FDI and Origin Countries’ Risk  
 
Sovereign Risk 
 
 
Notes: non-stressed (NS); Euro Area (EA); GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain); Non-Euro Area 
(NEA). 
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Banking Risk 
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Notes: non-stressed (NS); Euro Area (EA); GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain); Non-Euro Area 
(NEA). 
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2.A.2 – Logarithm of Euro Area FDI and macro-economic fundamentals 
 
Sovereign Risk  
 
 
Notes: non-stressed (NS); Euro Area (EA); GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain); Non-Euro Area 
(NEA). 
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Banking Risk 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
Notes: non-stressed (NS); Euro Area (EA); GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain); Non-Euro Area 
(NEA). 
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2.B – Additional test results  
 
2.B.1 – Baseline Model – including cross-sectional and time fixed effects  
 
Dep. Variable
Constant
comm_lang
log(distance)
log(Country Risk)
Cross-section F.E.
Time F.E.
Observations
R-squared
Table 5 - Country Risk impact on inward and outward FDI volume
Country risk
Banking Risk measure Sovereign Risk measure
Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets 10-year Sovereign Bonds' yields
Origin country Host country Origin country Host country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1.654) (1.825) (0.906) (0.875)
1.333*** 1.419*** 1.466*** 1.444***
log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI)
23.872*** 14.253*** 15.661*** 15.131***
(0.129) (0.125) (0.111) (0.113)
-2.812*** 0.538 -1.471*** 0.019
(0.389) (0.399) (0.371) (0.400)
-1.370*** -1.283*** -0.951*** -1.220***
(0.438) (0.529) (0.148) (0.408)
5,110 5,110 3,881 4,793
0.478
Yes Yes Yes
0.457 0.548 0.45
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Note: In Table 5, we clustered standard errors by host country. 
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B.2 – Baseline Model – including a proxy for economic growth 
 
Dep. Variable
Constant
comm_lang
log(distance)
log(Country Risk)
Observations
R-squared
Lagged(Growth in log GDP per 
capita)
Table 6 - Country Risk impact on inward and outward FDI volume
Country risk
Sovereign Risk measureBanking Risk measure
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4,793
0.190
5,085 5,110
0.190 0.157
3,871
0.237
(0.046)
-0.033
(0.211)
0.803
(0.495) (0.076)(0.073)
(0.045)
-2.955***
(0.250)
0.519***
(0.511)
(0.048)
-1.236***
(0.063)
0.415***
(0.047)
-0.937***
(0.063)
2.496***
14.390***
(0.360)
2.676***
(0.160)
-0.992***
(0.143)
-1.353***
14.542***
(0.723)
3.378***
(0.139)
-1.276***
14.901***
(0.364)
3.084***
(0.149)
-1.182***
log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI)
Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets 10-year Sovereign Bonds' yields
log(FDI)
23.225***
(0.804)
3.251***
Origin country Host country Origin country Host country
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Country risk
Dep. Variable
Constant
comm_lang
log(distance)
log(Country Risk)
Observations
R-squared
1,660
0.156
0.420***
(0.106)
1,202
0.286
1.631**
(0.674)
1,660
0.169
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
0.503***
(0.097)
0.446
(0.698)
3,439
0.193
3,450
0.165
0.415***
(0.101)
3.975***
(0.746)
2,669
0.230
3,133
0.223
0.563***
(0.103)
1,646
0.203
1.656**
(0.677)
Country risk
Banking Risk measure Sovereign Risk measure Banking Risk measure Sovereign Risk measure
Non-Stressed EA countries Stressed EA countries
Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets 10-year Sovereign Bonds' yields Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets 10-year Sovereign Bonds' yields
Table 7 - Country Risk impact on inward and outward FDI volume  (Stressed and Non-Stressed EA countries)
log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI) log(FDI)
(0.308) (0.269) (0.078)
-2.771*** 0.241 -1.159*** -1.241*** -3.456*** 0.585 -1.381*** -0.678***
(0.077) (0.424) (0.378) (0.101) (0.123)
-1.355*** -1.262*** -0.991*** -1.155*** -1.526*** -1.491*** -1.240*** -1.513***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.060) (0.058) (0.092) (0.095) (0.090) (0.093)
3.054*** 3.130*** 2.502*** 2.679*** 3.350*** 3.607*** 3.060*** 3.553***
(0.178) (0.167) (0.189) (0.181) (0.242) (0.243) (0.280) (0.245)
22.535*** 13.502*** 14.095*** 14.701*** 26.439*** 15.012*** 16.970*** 17.696***
(1.000) (0.885) (0.441) (0.449) (1.391) (1.331) (0.710) (0.767)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Origin country Host country Origin country Host country Origin country Host country Origin country Host country
Lagged(Growth in log GDP 
per capita)
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B.3 – Baseline Model – including one lag of the dependent variable 
 
Dep. Variable
Constant
Lagged(log(FDI))
comm_lang
log(distance)
log(Country Risk)
Observations
R-squared
(4)
Regulatory Capital/Risk-weighted Assets 10-year Sovereign Bonds' yields
Origin country Host country Origin country Host country
4.938*** 1.950***
(1) (2) (3)
log(FDI) log(FDI)
(0.027) (0.026)
(0.099) (0.084)
-0.229*** -0.193*** -0.162*** -0.200***
0.069
(0.087)
(0.026) (0.025)
(0.083) (0.084)
log(FDI) log(FDI)
0.881***
Country risk
Banking Risk measure
0.855*** 0.870***
(0.009)
0.430*** 0.437*** 0.493*** 0.438***
(0.507) (0.338) (0.265) (0.248)
0.872***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
-0.892***
(0.128)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.285***
-0.112***
(0.027)
3,321
0.841
2.363***
-0.096***
(0.023)
4,016
0.846
4,292
0.856
Table 8 - Baseline model including also the lag of log(FDI)
4,292
0.854
Sovereign Risk measure
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B.4 – Baseline Model – including both origin and host countries 
 
Table 9 - Baseline model including both origin and host countries
Country risk
Dep. Variable
Constant
comm_lang
log(distance)
log(Country Risk_oc)
log(Country Risk_hc)
Observations
R-squared
(1) (2)
log(FDI) log(FDI)
Sovereign Risk
-1.355*** -0.938***
(0.045) (0.049)
3.255*** 2.462***
(0.145) (0.171)
23.469*** 14.521***
(0.974) (0.375)
Banking Risk
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Reg Capital/Risk-
weighted Assets
10-year 
Sovereign Bond 
Yields
Robust standard errors in parentheses
5,110 3,642
0.186 0.241
0.166 -0.578***
(0.210) (0.062)
-3.187*** -0.997***
(0.250) (0.070)
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